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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effects of agglomeration economies (AE) on the sensitivity of firm 
location to tax differentials. An initial reading of the story suggests that, with AE, when a firm moves into 
a community attracted by a tax reduction, other firms may decide to move in as well. This suggests that 
AE increase the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes. However, a second version of the story reads 
that, if economic activities are highly concentrated in space, AE might offset any tax differential, hence 
suggesting a reduction in this sensitivity. This paper provides a theoretical model of intraregional firm 
location with Marshallian AE that is able to generate both hypotheses: AE increase (decrease) the effect 
of taxes when locations are (are not) of a similar size. We then use Spanish municipal data for the period 
1995-2002 to test these hypotheses, analyzing the combined effect of local business taxes and 
Marshallian AE on the intraregional location of employment. In line with the theory, a municipality with 
stronger AE experiences lower (higher) tax effects if it is sufficiently dissimilar (similar) to its neighbors 
in terms of size. 
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RESUMEN: En este trabajo examinamos el efecto de las economías de aglomeración (EA) sobre la 
sensibilidad de la localización de la actividad económica a diferenciales fiscales. Una primera intuición 
sugiere que, en presencia de EA, los impuestos tienen un mayor impacto en la localización de la actividad 
económica. Si una empresa se traslada a una jurisdicción como consecuencia de una reducción de tipos 
impositivos, esta jurisdicción pasa a ser más atractiva debido a que las EA han incrementado en esta 
jurisdicción. Como resultado, otras empresas pueden también decidir trasladarse a esta jurisdicción. Sin 
embargo, si la actividad económica está geográficamente muy concentrada, las EA convertirán unas 
pocas jurisdicciones en sitios altamente atractivos para las empresas y reducirán así el papel de los 
diferenciales fiscales. En este trabajo utilizamos un modelo de localización intraregional de empresas con 
EA Marshallianas que genera estas dos hipótesis: EA aumentan (disminuyen) el efecto de los 
diferenciales fiscales cuando las jurisdicciones son de un tamaño similar (distinto). Contrastamos estas 
hipótesis con una muestra de datos de municipios españoles para el periodo 1995-2002 analizando el 
efecto combinado del impuesto municipal sobre negocios (Impuesto sobre actividades económicas) y de 
las EA Marshallianas en la localización intraregional del empleo. De acuerdo con la teoría, los resultados 
indican que un municipio con EA más intensas se ve menos (más) afectado al subir impuestos si éste es 
similar (distinto) a sus vecinos en términos de tamaño. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
When firms are mobile across jurisdictions and business taxation is decentralized, a government 
that raises its tax rate risks triggering an outflow of economic activity. In fear of reducing its tax 
base, a government might set a tax rate that is too low and, as a result, there might be an 
underprovision of local public goods. This is the so-called race to the bottom result which has 
been highlighted in the tax competition literature1. Several factors can affect the sensitivity to 
taxes on the part of firms and, as a result, the intensity of tax competition. One such factor is 
mobility. A government whose tax base is made up of firms that are intrinsically attached to its 
jurisdiction can afford to neglect the impact of taxes on the size of its tax base. Another factor 
are agglomeration economies (AE). By AE we refer to any mechanism that drives economic 
agents to locate close to each other. A first story suggests that, in the presence of AE, economic 
activities can be quite responsive to tax differentials (White, 1998). Suppose a jurisdiction in 
which taxes are being cut. At first it will attract a number of firms. This larger tax base means 
higher AE and, thus, other firms may decide to move into the same jurisdiction (Story 1). This 
suggests that AE could increase the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes. However, a 
second story suggests that, if economic activities are concentrated in a single jurisdiction to 
begin with, AE may imply lower effects of taxes. This occurs because AE ensure that one 
jurisdiction is a much better place to run a business and these effects will generally offset any 
tax differential (Story 2). Hence, depending on the specific context, AE can imply higher or 
lower effects of taxes.  
 
At the theoretical level, the effect of AE on the intensity of tax competition has been addressed 
from two perspectives, which in their turn have generated different predictions regarding the 
sensitivity of firm location to taxes. Adopting the first perspective are papers by Boadway et al. 
(2004), Burbidge et al. (2004) and González (2005) which extend the Basic Tax Competition 
Model (BCTM) by considering Marshallian AE. In this case, the productivity of local firms 
increases with the scale of the local economy. Burbidge et al. (2004) and González (2005) 
explicitly address the role of AE in the sensitivity of economic activities to taxes. They find that 
AE increase tax effects and, as a result, exacerbate tax competition. The intuition behind Story 1 
is thus stressed in this strand of the literature.  
 
Adopting the second perspective are papers that study tax competition by using New Economic 
Geography models (NEG). Market access and the cost of living effect constitute the 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the tax competition literature. 
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 agglomerative forces in NEG models2. If these effects are strong enough, then a Core-Periphery 
equilibrium (C-P) arises. In a C-P equilibrium, before-tax profits in the core are higher than 
those in the periphery3. This means that small changes in tax rates may have no effect on the 
allocation of economic activities. Borck and Pflüger (2006) extend this literature by considering 
tax competition in an NEG model where partial and stable C-P equilibria may arise. In this 
setting, the periphery will always host a number of firms and mobility ensures that after-tax 
profits are equal across regions. Small tax changes will, thus, cause some firms to change 
location. It turns out that this effect decreases with the strength of AE (Story 2). However, in 
NEG models, when AE are not strong enough to sustain a C-P equilibrium, a diversified 
equilibrium arises instead. In this case the prediction of the model is reversed, that is, stronger 
AE result in taxes having a higher effect (taking us back once more to Story 1). Hence, NEG 
models predict that AE reduce the effect of taxes if jurisdictions differ sufficiently in size and 
increase the effect of taxes between jurisdictions of a similar size. Whatever the case, it is the C-
P equilibrium that has received the bulk of the attention in the NEG framework and, as a 
consequence of this, this literature has stressed the result that AE decrease the effect of taxes 
(Story 2). 
 
As discussed above, the intensity of tax competition is determined by the degree to which firms 
react to taxes, which is, in the end, an empirical question. A number of studies have aimed to 
test and quantify the effect of taxes on the location of economic activities. Bartik (1991), in 
reviewing early evidence from the US, concludes that local and regional taxes matter to some 
extent. More recent contributions have generally corroborated this result4. However, empirical 
studies examining how the interplay between AE and taxes shapes the spatial distribution of 
economic activities remain scarce5. Devereux et al. (2007), in an analysis of the effectiveness of 
a subsidy aimed at encouraging plants to locate in economically depressed UK regions, found 
that effectiveness increased with the number of same-industry plants located in the target region. 
Brülhart et al. (2007), drawing on the fact that different industries exhibit different degrees of 
                                                 
2 See Baldwin et al. (2003) for more details on the workings of NEG models. 
 
3 The difference in before-tax profits constitutes an agglomeration rent which can be taxed by the core 
government. Papers that stress this result include Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), 
Anderson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
 
4 Recent evidence from the US indicating that local and regional taxes do matter can be found in Hines 
(1996), Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), Mark et al. (2000) and Haughwout et al. (2004). Non-US 
evidence suggesting similar conclusions includes Feld and Kirchgässner (2002) and Brülhart et al. (2007) 
for Switzerland, Buettner (2003) for Germany, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003) and Jofre-
Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2007) for Spain. 
 
5A related study is Carlsen et al. (2005), who examine the effect of mobility on local taxes. Norwegian 
municipalities whose tax base is made up of relatively mobile industries were found to set lower tax rates, 
ceteris paribus. 
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 AE, tested whether or not firms belonging to industries in which AE are particularly intense are 
less sensitive to tax differentials. They addressed the question by examining the impact of local 
corporate tax rates on plant births across Swiss municipalities. They found that those firms 
belonging to industries exhibiting a relatively high Ellison-Glaeser index (1997), a well-
established measure of AE, were less responsive to tax differentials. Charlot and Paty (2007) 
examined the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent created by a market access effect, by 
testing the hypothesis that governments with access to high demand set higher tax rates. Their 
empirical analysis, conducted using French municipal data, concluded that municipalities which 
are geographically closer to high total income set higher taxes on business activities. 
 
Note, however, that all these papers are versions of Story 2 (i.e., AE reduce sensitivity to local 
taxes) while the theoretical discussion above suggests that this might not be the case in all 
instances. The objective of this paper is to shed some extra light on the effect AE might have on 
the sensitivity of economic activities to taxes at the empirical level, but allowing for both 
versions of the story: i.e., that AE may decrease or increase the effect of taxes depending on the 
specific case in question. To this end, we first provide a theoretical model of intraregional firm 
location which is able to generate both hypotheses. The model is a 2-jurisdiction, 2-input and 1-
good with Marshallian AE borrowed from Fujita and Thisse (2002) and extended here to 
account for local tax differentials. We find that the results of the interplay between AE and taxes 
obtained in an NEG model also hold in a model with Marshallian AE. In other words, AE result 
in an increase in the effect of taxes among jurisdictions that are similar in size and a reduction in 
these effects among jurisdictions that differ in size. 
 
We use Spanish municipal data for the period 1995-2002 to analyze the combined effect of the 
local business tax and Marshallian AE on the intraregional location of employment. This 
empirical set-up determines our modeling strategy in two ways. First, it determines the nature of 
the AE being considered. Fujita and Thisse (2002) consider that geographical agglomerations 
such as cities and highly specialized industrial and scientific districts are best explained by 
Marshallian AE, whereas market access and cost of living effects are better candidates for 
explaining agglomerations at a much larger geographical scale (e.g. “Manufacturing Belt” in the 
US or the “Blue Banana” in Europe). Therefore, here, we consider agglomerations at the 
municipal level as being driven by Marshallian AE. Second, we consider competition between 
municipalities that are geographic neighbors (insomuch as they belong to the same local labor 
market). This responds to the idea that taxes matter at a small geographic scale. Bartik (1991) 
stresses the fact that studies conducted at the intra-metropolitan level have generally produced 
larger estimates of the effects of taxes than those conducted at the inter-regional level. The 
underlying intuition is that neighboring municipalities are closer substitutes. First, 
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 municipalities that are neighbors share many of the same attributes, e.g. wages, quality of labor 
force and transportation facilities. Second, entrepreneurs and workers may be attached to a 
particular area and, therefore, mobility is higher between neighboring municipalities.  
 
Our empirical analysis is carried out using a panel of municipalities in the Spanish region of 
Catalonia for the period 1995-2002. The policy instrument we focus on is the local business tax 
(Impuesto sobre actividades económicas) which has been reported to affect employment (Solé-
Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2003) and firm location (Jofre-Monseny & Solé-Ollé, 2007). Our 
main goal is to analyze how the effect of the local business tax rate on municipal employment 
varies with AE and dissimilarity measures of the municipality. The level of AE is measured 
using variation in the strength of AE across industries and variation across municipalities in the 
industry mix. The econometric analysis takes into account the potential endogeneity of the tax 
rate and uses instrumental variables to estimate the equation. The selection of the instrument 
benefits from a specific legal trait of the Spanish local business tax. The law fixes maximum tax 
rates which vary discretely across municipalities according to population size, and which can be 
used as an exogenous source of variation in tax rates to produce instrumental variable estimates 
of the effects of interest.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical framework 
that models the effects of local taxes on the location of firms in the presence of AE. The 
empirical exercise is conducted in Section 3. Section 3.1 introduces the empirical specification. 
In section 3.2 we describe the data and variables. In section 3.3 we report and discuss ordinary 
least squares results, while instrumental variables results are dealt with in section 3.4. In Section 
3.5 we discuss some robustness checks. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. The economy 
 
The underlying economy is borrowed from Fujita and Thisse (2002, pp 270-278), although 
some of its variables are given a different interpretation here. There is a region with two 
communities: A and B. We consider two inputs. Entrepreneurs (E) are perfectly mobile and their 
number is normalized to one, i.e. EA+EB=1. L is a perfectly immobile input. Given that this 
analysis concerns jurisdictions which are not self-contained labor markets, this is best 
interpreted as land area. The price of the only output in the economy, Y, is assumed to be unity 
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 in both jurisdictions given the absence of trade costs. Output is produced under the following 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 A, BjLEEY jjjj =⋅⋅⋅= − for            )exp( 1 ααγ  [1] 
 
where j indexes the jurisdiction. Productivity increases with the number of entrepreneurs that 
locate in j due to Marshallian AE. γ  pins down the intensity of these AE, whose precise nature 
is left unspecified. 
 
The return of the immobile factor, jR , equals its marginal productivity: 
 
 A,B jLEER jjjj =⋅⋅⋅⋅−= − for          )exp()1( ααγα  [2] 
 
Hence, the share of output that accrues to entrepreneurs and their return are: 
 
 A,BjLEEEr jjjjj =⋅⋅⋅⋅=⋅ − for            )exp( 1 ααγα  [3] 
 
 A,BjLEEr jjjj =⋅⋅⋅⋅= −− for          )exp( 11 ααγα  [4] 
 
Migration of entrepreneurs, dEA, is assumed to be driven by the difference in log profits which 
amounts to: 
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Equilibrium requires no migration of entrepreneurs, 0=AdE , which can only occur with 
BA rr = . This model has two equilibrium regimes: the diversified and the partially agglomerated 
equilibrium regimes. The emergence of one or the other depends on the relative strength of 
agglomerative and dispersive forces. Marshallian AE lead firms to co-localize in space and this 
is the sole agglomerative force in this model. Dispersion forces stem from the fact that the 
immobile factor (L) shows decreasing returns to scale 1)1( <−α . The diversified equilibrium 
regime arises whenever )1(2 αγ −⋅< . If this inequality holds with the opposite sign, then the 
partially agglomerated regime equilibrium occurs. Note that this condition reveals that for an 
agglomerated equilibrium to arise, AE have to be large enough in comparison to the share of 
6
 output that accrues to the immobile input. Figure 1 plots AdE  against EA for the agglomerated 
and the diversified equilibrium regimes in the particular instance that BA LL = . 
 
Figure 1. Diversified and agglomerated equilibria in the absence of taxes. Equilibrium 
requires 0=AdE . 
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In the diversified equilibrium regime, there is a unique stable equilibrium which is symmetric in 
this particular case (E in Figure 1). In the partially agglomerated equilibrium regime, there are 
three equilibria but only the asymmetric ones are stable (E´ and E´´ in Figure 1). The core is the 
jurisdiction that ends up with the highest share of entrepreneurs. In the partially agglomerated 
equilibrium regime, we assume that A is the core and B is the periphery.  
 
2.2. Taxes and the allocation of entrepreneurs 
 
We introduce local taxation in the model. In particular, entrepreneurs are asked to pay a share 
jτ  of their income in the jurisdiction in which they settle. The migration equation amounts now 
to the difference in log after-tax profits: 
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 where T  is defined as the following tax gap: T= ))1/()1ln(( AB ττ −− . Equilibrium requires 
now that 0=−TdEA  which can only occur with BBAA rr ⋅−=⋅− )1()1( ττ . Totally 
differentiating expression 0=−TdEA  with respect to Aτ  yields the equilibrium outflow of 
entrepreneurs following a tax increase in jurisdiction A: 
 
 
)/()1(2
)1/(1
2
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A
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dE
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−= αγ
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τ  [7] 
 
where )/()1(2 2AA EE −−+ αγ  is nothing but the slope of dEA. In any stable equilibrium, 
raising the tax rate in jurisdiction A must decrease the number of entrepreneurs in this 
jurisdiction. This means that for EA to be a stable equilibrium, dEA has to be negatively sloped. 
In a diversified regime, dEA is negatively sloped for all EA (See A.1 in the Annex). In a partially 
concentrated equilibrium, this means that when γ  is very large in comparison to )1( α− , then 
it has to be the case that 1→AE . 
 
We now examine the effect of AE on the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials, i.e. 
( ) γτ dddEd AA / . This can be analyzed by looking at the slope of dEA. In particular, note that: 
 
 { } ( ){ }γαγγτ dEEdsigndddEdsign AAAA )/()1(2)/( 2−−+−=  [8] 
 
The derivative ( ) γαγ dEEd AA )/()1(2 2−−+  consists of a direct and an indirect effect: 
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where γddEA  denotes the equilibrium outflow of entrepreneurs following an increase in the 
strength of AE and it has been obtained by totally differentiating equation 0=−TdEA  with 
respect to γ : 
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 In the diversified symmetric equilibrium equation [10] is zero and the indirect effect vanishes. 
Since there is the same number of entrepreneurs in both jurisdictions, an increase in the strength 
of AE does not alter the allocation of entrepreneurs. This implies that in such equilibrium, an 
increase in the strength of AE always increases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to taxes. The 
underlying intuition is that which is stressed in the literature that has introduced Marshallian 
externalities in the BCTM framework. Following a rise in taxes, some of the entrepreneurs that 
were initially found in A will move to B. The fact that some entrepreneurs have left A makes this 
location less attractive, due to the loss of technological externalities, and increases the number 
of entrepreneurs who are willing to move out. 
 
In any asymmetric equilibrium where 2/1>AE , an increase in the strength of AE also 
increases the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs in jurisdiction A, i.e. 0>γddEA . Since the 
slope of dEA decreases in EA for any 2/1>AE , the indirect effect will be negative and hence 
will counterbalance the direct effect. In some instances the indirect effect will dominate. 
Suppose that most of the entrepreneurs are already found in jurisdiction A, 1→AE . In such an 
instance, remaining in jurisdiction B is only profitable because the scarcity of entrepreneurs in 
this jurisdiction has increased their return. But this return is highly sensitive to the arrival of 
new entrepreneurs6. Hence, in a setting where 1→AE , an increase in the strength of AE 
reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials. The reason is that as AE  increases, 
the number of entrepreneurs that jurisdiction B can absorb while keeping 
BBAA rr ⋅−=⋅− )1()1( ττ  decreases at a very fast rate. These intuitions are reflected in the 
following two results whose analytical details are deferred to the Annex. 
 
Result 1: In any stable diversified equilibrium, )1(2 αγ −⋅< , an increase in the strength of AE 
increases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to taxes if the distribution of entrepreneurs is 
sufficiently even across jurisdictions and decreases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to taxes 
otherwise (see A.2). 
 
Result 2: In any stable concentrated equilibrium, )1(2 αγ −⋅> , an increase in the strength of 
AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to taxes (see A.3). 
 
                                                 
6 When the number of entrepreneurs in jurisdiction B approaches zero (EB→ 0), the return of 
entrepreneurs in B, rB, tends to infinity due to the Inada conditions. 
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 To sum up, AE increase the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials if jurisdictions are 
similar to begin with, whereas they reduce this sensitivity if the economic activity is highly 
concentrated in one jurisdiction. These results parallel those obtained in the literature that has 
studied tax competition in NEG models. Result 1 may appear to contradict the results reported 
in González (2005), where it was found that the sensitivity of the mobile factor to a tax increase 
was always higher with AE. However, these results are obtained having neglected the effect of 
AE on the equilibrium allocation of the mobile factor7. 
 
In Figures 2, 3, and 4 we illustrate how an increase in the strength of AE affects the impact of a 
given positive tax gap, T, on the allocation of entrepreneurs. Figure 2 depicts the case where a 
stable diversified symmetric equilibrium occurs. As can be observed, the stronger AE are, the 
larger the delocation of entrepreneurs is (E´´-E is larger than E´-E). Figure 3 deals with the case 
where, although a stable diversified equilibrium emerges, the endowment of land area makes 
jurisdiction A a much better location for running a business. In this case, stronger AE lead to 
smaller outflows of entrepreneurs (E´´´-E´´ is smaller than E-E´). Figure 4 deals with the case 
where a concentrated equilibrium emerges. In this case, it is also easily seen that stronger AE 
lead to smaller sensitivity to taxes on the part of firms. 
 
Figure 2. The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of entrepreneurs 
to tax differentials in a diversified and symmetric equilibrium. 
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7 Burbidge et al. (2004) study tax competition in the presence of both AE and heterogeneity. They only 
comment on the impact of AE on the effects of taxes in the symmetric equilibrium. 
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 Figure 3. The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to tax differentials in a diversified equilibrium where 
entrepreneurs are highly concentrated in jurisdiction A. 
-1
0
1
0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
EA
dEA
E' E
E''' E''
Increase in the strength of 
agglomeration economies
Tax gap
 
 
 
Figure 4. The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to tax differentials in a concentrated equilibrium where 
jurisdiction A is the core. 
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 2.3 Testable predictions 
 
Our theoretical results are derived in a 2-jurisdiction, 2-input and 1-good framework. This 
implies that meaningful testable predictions do not follow strictly from the results of the model. 
In our view, the main message of the theoretical analysis is that the effect of AE on the 
sensitivity of economic activities to local taxes hinges on the level of similarity in size across 
competing jurisdictions. As explained above, we consider municipalities to compete more 
intensely with their neighbors. Hence, our notion of competing municipalities is that of 
neighboring municipalities. Taking this into account we posit the following two testable 
predictions: 
 
Testable prediction 1: A tax increase in jurisdiction i generates an outflow of economic 
activity which increases with the strength of AE in municipality i if this jurisdiction is 
sufficiently similar to its neighbors in terms of the amount of economic activity hosted. 
 
Testable prediction 2: A tax increase in jurisdiction i generates an outflow of economic 
activity which decreases with the strength of AE in municipality i if this jurisdiction is 
sufficiently dissimilar to its neighbors in terms of the amount of economic activity hosted. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1.Empirical specification 
 
In this paper we examine the effects of local tax rates on the location of economic activities in 
equilibrium. AE may increase or decrease the effect of taxes because when a plant relocates it 
changes profit opportunities across locations. This implies that the effects we are interested in 
are cumulative in nature. Hence, looking at the individual location decisions of new and re-
locating establishments (e.g., as in a conditional logit framework) does not seem appropriate in 
this particular context. Therefore, we define our dependent variable as an aggregate measure of 
economic activity. This could be either the number of firms or the number of employees in the 
municipality. There are a number of factors which, in practice and in the case of this particular 
analysis, lead us to prefer employment over the number of firms. First, note that there is no 
employment in the 2-input model introduced above. Since labour supply does not vary across 
municipalities within local labour markets, movements of firms and employees are conceptually 
equivalent. Entrepreneurs choose locations on the basis of profit differentials and workers 
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 commute where job opportunities arise. Second, note also that taxes may have effects on both 
the extensive (plant births and re-locations) and intensive (plant contractions and production 
movements within multi-plant firms) margins8, suggesting that the aggregate effect might be 
best captured by employment. Finally, employment growth is the main aggregate economic 
variable to be found in the literature on the effects of taxes on economic activity (see, e.g., 
Bartik, 1991).  
 
The baseline econometric model we consider is: 
 
 ittiitiitemp εαατβ +++⋅=)ln(  [11] 
 
where empit denotes employment in municipality i at time t and itτ  is the local business tax rate. 
Note that employment is measured in logs. This reflects the fact that a unit increase in the tax 
rate is likely to generate larger effects on employment levels in large municipalities only 
because tax bases are larger. Thus, our main parameter of interest iβ  measures the effect of the 
local tax rate on the percentage-change in employment. iα  is a municipal fixed-effect 
measuring time-invariant features that make jurisdiction i suitable for running a business. These 
features may include land availability, amenities, the presence of an international airport or 
access to transportation infrastructures. This municipal fixed-effect can also reflect history in 
terms of past levels of employment. tα  measures a year-specific effect which is common to all 
municipalities and may capture the state of the business cycle. Finally, itε  denotes a year-
municipal specific shock. First differencing equation [11] yields: 
 
 ittitiit uemp ++Δ⋅=Δ ')ln( ατβ  [12] 
 
where Δ  denotes the difference operator and kitititu −−≡ εε  k being a positive integer. Due to 
the cumulative nature of the effects of taxes, changes in employment have to be measured in a 
window of time which has to be long enough to enable the effects of interest to show up, i.e. k 
has to be large enough. Since the change in employment measured in logs is closely related to 
the employment growth rate, we use municipal employment growth to refer to our dependent 
variable.  
 
                                                 
8 For example, Gobillon et al. (2007) find that taxes affect plant size (extensive margin) but not new plant 
location (extensive margin). 
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 Our main goal is to investigate the way in which iβ  varies across municipalities. For that 
purpose we introduce a measure of the strength of AE at the municipal level, iγ . We also 
introduce a measure of the dissimilarity in size between a jurisdiction and its neighbors, iμ . We 
turn to the definition of these variables in the next section. Our empirical strategy relies on 
allowing the local tax rate effect to be a function of the AE and dissimilarity measures at the 
initial time period. We posit the following functional form for iβ : 
 
 kitkitkiti −−− ⋅⋅+⋅+≡ μγβγβββ 321  [13] 
 
where 1β , 2β  and 3β  are parameters to be estimated. The effect of an increase in the strength 
of AE on the effect of taxes is seen by differentiating iβ  with respect to kit−γ : 
 
 kit
kit
i
d
d
−
−
⋅+= μββγ
β
32  [14] 
 
We expect kit−⋅+ μββ 32  to be negative when the degree of similarity between jurisdiction i 
and its neighbors, kit−μ , is low enough (Testable prediction 1). Instead we expect 
kit−⋅+ μββ 32  to be positive when jurisdiction i is sufficiently dissimilar to its neighbors, i.e. 
kit−μ  is high enough (Testable prediction 2). For this to be the case 3β  has to be positive 
( 03 >β ) whereas no particular sign is expected for 2β . 
 
3.2. Data and variables 
 
Data: The empirical analysis is carried out with municipal data for the period 1995-2002. The 
sample is restricted from the outset to the 946 municipalities of Catalonia, a region in north-east 
Spain9. The analysis is restricted to Catalonia as employment data for this period are not 
available to researchers for all the Spanish municipalities, with the exception of the year 2002, 
which we use in some of our calculations (see below). Employment data at the municipal level 
are drawn from the Social Security Register database. These data are available at the 2-digit 
                                                 
9 In 2002, the local business tax was reformed and from 2003 onwards municipal tax rates were no longer 
comparable with those set in previous years. 
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 level of sectoral detail which yields 49 industries10. Unfortunately, the analysis could not be 
carried out with all municipalities in the region due to data availability. Specifically, tax rates 
are only available for municipalities exceeding 5,000 inhabitants in 1995, 1,000 inhabitants 
between 1996 and 1999 and all municipalities from 2000 onwards. This means that we are able 
to use 256 municipalities for the first period, and 419 for the second, making a total of 675 
observations. As discussed in section 3.1, the effects we are looking at are cumulative and 
therefore we are not interested in one-year time changes. Since municipal elections were held in 
1995 and 1999 and tax rates for year t are decided at the end of 1−t  we examine the two non-
overlapping three-year periods, namely Dec. 1995 to Dec.  1998 and Dec. 1999 to Dec. 2002. 
Hence, we use the variation in tax rates that occurred during the first three term-of-office years, 
implying k =3. In Table 1 descriptive statistics of the data are provided11. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics by sub-periods. 
 1995-1998 1999-2002 
Change in log employment; )ln( itempΔ  0.182 (0.164) 
0.127 
(0.193) 
Change in the local business tax rate; itτΔ  0.024 (0.057) 0.040 (0.074) 
Dissimilarity measure; 3−itμ  0.092 (0.146) 0.084 (0.138) 
Agglomeration measure; 3−itγ  0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
Employmentt-3 
5,859 
(41,527) 
4,691 
(38,893) 
No. of Municipalities 256 419 
 
 
Local taxes: The size of Spanish municipal governments is moderate, with municipal budgets 
representing 15% of total public spending. Inter-governmental grants represent a third of local 
budgets while local taxes represent another third and the remainder consist of user charges. The 
business sector is charged a number of municipal taxes and fees. This list includes a local 
business tax, a property tax, a tax on vehicles, a tax on building activities, and a tax on the sale 
of land and buildings. Although the property tax (Impuesto sobre la propiedad immueble) 
comes first in terms of tax revenue, the local business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades 
                                                 
10 The Spanish 2-digit classification (CNAE 93) currently comprises 60 industries. However, in 1995 a 
different classification was used (CNAE 74). In order to make these data comparable industries have to be 
aggregated yielding 49 economic sectors. 
 
11 Note that a longer window (e.g., k=6) would have impeded the control for period-specific common 
shocks, which seem to be relevant in our case (see section 3). 
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 Económicas) is the main local tax burden borne by the business sector12. Jofre-Monseny and 
Solé-Ollé (2007) reported that the effect of the local business tax on the location of new 
establishments outweighed that of the property tax by a factor of 4. No effect was found for the 
remaining local taxes or for spending. 
 
The local business tax liability of each firm is based on a presumed level of profits. This 
presumed level of profits is determined by national tax laws according to input usages and the 
economic sector of the firm. This presumed level of profits is the modified at the municipal 
level at being multiplied by a municipal tax rate, iτ . Hence, differences in business tax rates 
mean that firms pay different shares of their profits in different municipalities. Municipal 
governments are given quite considerable tax autonomy and local business statutory tax rates 
can vary from 0.8 to 1.9. However, the range within which municipalities can set their tax rate 
varies with population size. The maximum tax rate increases from 1.4 (<5,000 inhabitants) to 
1.6 (5,001-20,000 inhabitants), to 1.7 (20,001-50,000 inhabitants), to 1.8 (50,001-100,000 
inhabitants) and to 1.9 (>100,0000 inhabitants). In Figure 5 we plot the local business tax rate 
against population for all municipalities whose population exceeds 1,000 inhabitants in 199913. 
Instead, the minimum tax rate is 0.8 for all municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed description of local business taxation in Spain see Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé 
(2007). 
 
13 This is the sample used in carrying out the subsequent econometric analysis. 
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 Figure 5. Scatter plot of business tax rates vs. population in 1999. Legal maximum 
business tax rates jump at 5, 20, 50 and 100 thousand inhabitants. 
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Note that the variation in statutory tax rates is considerable. Note too, that the number of 
municipalities that set a tax rate that is equal to the maximum permitted by law is 36%. Besides, 
from 1996 to 2002, for municipalities with at least 1,000 inhabitants, the share of municipalities 
whose maximum tax rate was binding increased from 32% to 42%14. This reflects the fact that 
local business tax rates increased over the period studied. 
 
The strength of AE in municipality i: We identify variation in the strength of AE across 
municipalities from two sources: 1) Variation in the strength of AE across industries; 2) 
Variation in the industry mix across municipalities. Thus, a municipality in which industries 
with high AE are over-represented is classified as a municipality with strong AE. Differences in 
the strength of AE across industries are identified from differences in the geographic 
concentration of industries. The Ellison-Glaeser agglomeration index (1997) is a well-
established measure of the geographic concentration of an industry. This index measures the 
extent to which an industry is geographically concentrated while controlling for: 1) The 
                                                 
14 Note that our analysis is restricted to municipalities with at least 1,000 inhabitants. We do not have 
information on all municipalities in 1995 with a population between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. 
Therefore we undertake a comparison between 1996 and 2002. 
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 geographic concentration of the economic activity in general; 2) The fact that industries differ in 
their industrial organization15. This index can be understood as a measure of the tendency of 
plants within an industry to co-locate in space. Therefore, it can be considered a measure of the 
strength of AE within one industry. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) also proposed a co-
agglomeration index, which computes the tendency of plants from different industries to co-
locate in space. The co-agglomeration index measures the strength of AE across industries. 
Plant-level data are required to compute Ellison-Glaeser indices. Following Guimarães et al. 
(2007), here we construct our indices using data from plant-counts16. These authors show that 
plant-count data and the original Ellison-Glaeser versions of the index yield the same expected 
value. Besides, the variance of the index is smaller using plant-count data. We compute a 
49×49 matrix of agglomeration and co-agglomeration indices. The element nm,γ  measures the 
strength of AE between firms of the mth and nth industries. If nm =  then the co-agglomeration 
index is just the agglomeration index for the mth industry. These pair wise indices are computed 
using data from all continental Spanish municipalities for the year 2002. We propose the 
following measure of the strength of AE in municipality i: 
 
 ∑∑
∀ ∀
⋅=
m n
nm
ii nmp
,),( γγ  [15] 
 
where ),( nmpi  stands for the probability that on drawing two employees randomly from 
municipality i, one will belong to industry m and the other to industry n. The probability 
),( nmpi  can be written as: 
 
 ∑∑ ⋅=
n
i
in
m
i
im
i emp
emp
emp
empnmp ),(  [16] 
 
where empim and empin denote the employment levels of the mth and nth industry in municipality 
i. Note that iγ  captures the extent to which industries (and pairs of industries) with high AE are 
over-represented in a municipality. 
 
                                                 
15 Note that an industry which comprises a small number of plants will necessarily be highly concentrated 
spatially. 
 
16 This implies that: 1) the share of plants in each industry is used instead of the share of employment in 
each industry; 2.) the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index for each industry is replaced by 1 over the sum of 
plants in each industry. 
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 Dissimilarity between jurisdiction i and its neighbors: Testable predictions 1 and 2 imply that 
the effect of AE on the sensitivity of economic activity to taxes depends crucially on the way in 
which jurisdiction i relates to its neighbors in terms of size. We consider two municipalities to 
be neighbors if they belong to the same local labor market17. The proposed measure of 
dissimilarity between municipality i and its neighbors is: 
 
 ∑
∈
−⋅−= lj jili
ssabs
N
)(
1
1μ  [17] 
 
where lN  is the number of municipalities that constitute local labor market l and is  and js  are 
the shares of municipalities i and j in the employment of local labor market l. Hence, expression 
[16] is the expected difference in employment shares between municipality i and a jurisdiction 
drawn randomly from its local labor market18. 
 
In Catalonia, and elsewhere, the municipality size distribution is highly skewed to the right. 
Hence, our dissimilarity measure, iμ , will typically be high for the largest municipality in the 
local labor market which often acts as a central business district. For the remaining 
municipalities the dissimilarity measure will typically be low. This is so because small 
municipalities, as opposed to their larger counterparts, tend to have many neighbors that are 
similar in size. Hence, although economic activities are highly concentrated in space, most 
jurisdictions compete with many similarly sized neighbors. 
 
3.3. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates 
 
Endogeneity is the main econometric concern when estimating the effect of local taxes on the 
location of economic activities. More specifically, we are particularly concerned that shocks in 
employment might be correlated to changes in tax rates, given that municipal authorities may 
alter these rates in response to shocks in municipal employment. Suppose a left-wing mayor 
sees that a large plant abandons her municipality. She may then come under some pressure to 
                                                 
17 The local labour markets to which we refer have been computed by Roca and Moix (2004). 
Municipalities are aggregated in groups according to commuting considerations. Broadly speaking, each 
local labour market is built to ensure people live and work within its boundaries. Thus, the 946 
municipalities make up 41 local labour markets. With this level of aggregation, approximately 75% of the 
people live and work in the same local labour market. 
 
18 We have used other variables to capture dissimilarity in terms of size. For instance, we have computed 
expected differences in employment levels instead of differences in employment shares. We have also 
used other notions of geographic neighborhood (inverse distance weighting instead of using the binary 
notion of belonging to the same local labor market). The results obtained when using these alternative 
measures of dissimilarity remain largely unchanged. 
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 cut taxes and she may do so which implies that 0),cov( 3 ≠− itit τε . Hence, 3−−≡ itititu εε  may 
be correlated to itτΔ  and OLS estimates of the effects of taxes on employment growth may be 
biased19. One way to attenuate this endogeneity bias is to introduce controls for the different 
shocks that might affect municipalities within the region asymmetrically. In order to control for 
shocks that may be specific to small geographic areas within the region, we introduce 
×year local labor market fixed effects. From a conceptual point of view, this step is highly 
significant to our analysis. Note that the inclusion of these fixed effects amounts to exploit the 
variation in tax rates that arises within local labor markets. This fits with our notion that 
neighboring jurisdictions compete more intensely over tax bases. Municipalities in which 
industries experiencing decline are over-represented may experience little growth. To control 
for industry mix related shocks we construct the following variable: 
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which is no more than the employment growth that municipality i would experience if every 
industry in i grew at the same rate as that experienced by the industry at the regional level. 
Finally, we also introduce the initial employment level to capture mean reverting behavior.  
 
Although these controls can explain a considerable degree of variation in employment growth 
across municipalities, their inclusion as control variables is not likely to eliminate the 
endogeneity bias completely. However, note that our main object of interest is not the average 
effect of taxes. This enables us to take a difference-in-difference sort of approach. Recall our 
baseline econometric specification20: 
 
 itititititititit uemp +⋅⋅Δ⋅+⋅Δ⋅+Δ⋅=Δ −−− 333321)ln( μγτβγτβτβ  [19] 
 
Note that we can right the linear projection of itu  onto the observables in equation [19] in error 
form as: 
 
                                                 
19 Note that 3−itε  is, in principle, uncorrelated to 3−itτ  since the latter is set at the end of 4−itτ . 
 
20 For the sake of simplicity we do not include a constant term (or any local labor market dummies) or the 
other controls in equations [19], [20] and [21]. Our argument also holds when these variables are 
included. 
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  ititititititititu υμγτδγτδτδ +⋅⋅Δ⋅+⋅Δ⋅+Δ⋅= −−− 333321  [20] 
 
where itυ  is an error term. If we plug expression [20] into [19] we obtain: 
 
 ititititititititemp υμγτδβγτδβτδβ +⋅⋅Δ⋅++⋅Δ⋅++Δ⋅+=Δ −−− 333332211 )()()()ln(  [21] 
 
Note that itυ  is uncorrelated to all variables in this equation by construction. Hence, unbiased 
estimates of 2β  and 3β  can be obtained through an OLS regression of equation [21] as long as 
02 =δ  and 03 =δ . Hence, our identifying assumption is that governments change tax rates 
according to shocks in employment regardless of the values that the AE and dissimilarity 
measures take. Given the possibility that the AE and dissimilarity measures ( 3−itγ  and 3−itμ ) 
may be correlated to employment shocks, itu , it is necessary to check that OLS estimates of 
equation [21] are robust to the inclusion of 3−itγ  and 33 −− ⋅ itit μγ  as separate control variables. 
 
OLS results: In Table 2 we present the OLS estimates of the equation in which we are 
interested. Both the agglomeration and the dissimilarity measures have been standardized to a 
mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. All estimations include ×year local labor 
market fixed effects. Specifications [2], [3] and [4] include the employment level at the base 
year. Specifications [3] and [4] also include the variable measuring industry mix shocks, i.e. 
itη . Specification [4] includes additionally 3−itγ  and 33 −− ⋅ itit μγ  as separate control variables. 
In all specifications, F-tests of year× local labor market vs. year effects reject the hypothesis 
that fixed effects do not vary across local labor markets for a given year. The employment level 
at the base year is found to exert a negative effect on municipal employment growth. In its turn, 
the variable measuring the industry mix shock for municipality i, itη  is statistically significant 
and takes the expected sign and order of magnitude. The control variables 3−itγ  and 33 −− ⋅ itit μγ  
are jointly not significantly different from zero. In light of these results, we consider 
specification [3] to be our preferred specification. Note, however, that our results regarding the 
effects of taxes do not undergo any significant changes across specifications. 
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 Table 2. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). Changes 
defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 1999-2002. 
OLS estimates. 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 
i) Intertwined effects of local taxes and AE 
-0.298 -0.300 -0.238 -0.256 
itτΔ  (-1.587) (-1.597) (-1.292) (-1.359) 
-0.516 -0.519 -0.385 -0.431 
3−⋅Δ itit γτ  (-2.216)** (-2.226)** (-1.670)* (-1.743)* 
0.279 0.274 0.257 0.256 
33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  (3.796)*** (3.728)*** (3.593)*** (2.702)** 
ii) Controls     
-0.014 -0.016 -0.015 Employmentt-3 (×105) -.- (-2.283)** (2.500)*** (-1.780)* 
0.496 0.528 Industry mix shock  -.- -.- (2.619)*** (2.473)** 
Local labor market dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
333   & −−− ⋅ ititit μγγ  No No No Yes 
1.637 1.577 1.442 1.433 F-test of Significance of Local 
labor market shocks  [0.001] [0.003] [0.013] [0.014] 
Wald test for: 
0 333 =⋅= −−− ititit μγγ  -.- -.- -.- 
0.210 
[0.813] 
R2 0.189 0.183 0.193 0.197 
No. Observations 675 675 675 675 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 
10% level. Figures within brackets are p-values.  
 
 
As explained above, the OLS estimate of 1β , measuring the average effect of a rise in taxes, is 
most likely to be biased. Hence, we focus here on the interaction terms between taxes and the 
AE and dissimilarity measures. Most importantly, 3β  is positive and statistically different from 
zero. This is consistent with testable predictions 1 and 2 above. Given the point estimates of 2β  
(-0.385) and 3β  (0.257) obtained in specification [3], we can obtain the threshold that solves 
0332 =⋅+ −itμββ . This threshold is 1.5. This implies that AE reduce the effect of taxes if 3−itμ  
is, at least, 1.5 standard deviations larger than the mean. The opposite is the case for 
dissimilarity levels below this threshold. Around 14% of our sample shows a dissimilarity 
measure above 1.5 standard deviations. This implies that for most of our sample stronger AE 
imply the more marked effect of taxes. This can be explained by the fact that most 
municipalities are small and generally compete with many similarly sized neighbors. 
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 3.4. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates 
 
Obtaining a reliable estimate of the average effect of tax rate changes on employment growth, 
i.e. 1β , is interesting in itself but, above all, it enables us to place the estimates of 2β  and 3β  in 
context. That is, in order to know the extent to which AE influence the effect of taxes, we need 
an estimate of the average effect of the variable of interest. This calls for an instrumental 
variables approach which requires some exogenous variation in local business tax rates. 
 
Instruments: The source of exogenous variation we rely on comes from a particular institutional 
characteristic of Spain’s local business tax: namely, that there are legal limits on maximum tax 
rates which vary across municipalities discretely according to population size (See section 3.2 
and Figure 5). Here, we aim at using the maximum taxate as an instrumental variable for the tax 
rate change. 
 
The first requirement an instrumental variable has to satisfy is that it must shift the variable of 
interest. Data on local business tax rates present two important features in this respect, 
highlighted above in section 3.2. First, the share of municipalities whose maximum tax rate is 
binding is not low (30-40% range). Second, local business tax rates increased during the period 
1995-2002. As a result, the share of municipalities whose maximum tax rate is binding also 
increased during this same period (from 32% to 42%). For most municipalities with binding 
maximum tax rates, the decision to change tax rates is obviously a constrained one. Hence, 
maximum tax rates are very likely to determine in part tax rate choices as well as their changes. 
For non-binding municipalities, maximum tax rates can partly determine tax setting behavior, 
too. For instance, municipal governments may be reluctant to choose the maximum tax rate 
level, or one which is too close to it, since this leaves them with no room for maneuver in case 
of future budget difficulties. Hence, the assumption that maximum tax rates shift tax rate 
changes seems a plausible one. Note that this is a testable assumption and one that we examine 
below. 
 
The second requirement for an instrumental variable is that it should be uncorrelated to the error 
term. In our case this means that maximum tax rates should be uncorrelated to shocks in 
employment growth. Maximum tax rates are not exogenous since they vary with population 
size. However, we claim that maximum tax rates are uncorrelated to shocks in employment 
growth conditional on the employment level in the base year, year×local labor market fixed 
effects and our variable capturing industry mix related shocks. Our maintained assumption is 
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 that these controls will absorb any correlation between population size and shocks in 
employment growth. 
 
The maximum tax rate may not be the only instrumental variable this particular institutional set-
up may generate. For instance, another candidate instrument is the distance to the maximum tax 
rate ( 3−− itMaxit ττ ). It is reasonable to think that it is this distance and not the maximum tax rate 
itself that determines the tax rate setting behavior. However, a gain in terms of increasing the 
capacity to shift taxes may come at the cost of decreasing our confidence that the instrument is 
uncorrelated to shocks in employment. Suppose that shocks in employment are serially 
correlated, i.e. 0),cov( 1 ≠−itit εε . A negative shock in 4−t  may lead to a tax increase in 3−t  
and hence 3−itτ  may be correlated to 3−itε  if 0),cov( 34 ≠−− itit εε . Thus 3−− itMaxit ττ  may not be 
a valid instrument in the sense that it can be correlated to 3−−≡ itititu εε  through 4−itε . 
However, we can use the interaction term between the distance to the maximum and being a 
left-wing government, i.e. leftit
Max
it ⋅− − )( 3ττ 21. The idea is that left-wing governments set 
higher tax rates than their right-wing counterparts. In fact, the share of left-wing governments 
whose maximum tax rates are binding is remarkably higher. In 1999, this share was 42% for 
left-wing governments and 25% for right-wing governments. Hence, conditional on a given 
distance to the maximum ( 3−− itMaxit ττ ) being a left-wing government may generate an extra 
boost in terms of expected tax rate increases which can be considered to be uncorrelated to 
shocks in employment growth. 
 
Instrumental variables results: We now turn to the data to assess the degree to which: 1) The 
instrument shifts the endogenous variable (the model is identified); 2) There are any grounds to 
suspect that the instruments are correlated with the error term. We focus this discussion on 
estimating an average effect of tax rate increases on employment growth. That is, we leave out, 
for the time being, the interaction terms between tax rate changes and the AE and dissimilarity 
measures. Columns 1 and 3 report first and second stage estimates when the only excluded 
instrument used is the maximum tax rate ( Maxitτ ). Columns 2 and 4 report the results obtained 
when both Maxitτ  and the interaction term leftitMaxit ⋅− − )( 3ττ  are used as excluded instruments. 
 
                                                 
21 By left-wing government we refer to governments whose mayor belongs to the Socialist Party 
(PSC/PSOE) or the Green Party (IC/IU). The share of left-wing governments was 34% in Dec. 1995-Dec. 
1998 and fell to 27% in Dec. 1999-Dec. 2002. 
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 Table 3. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). Changes 
defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 1999-
2002. Instrumental variables estimates. 
 First-Stage Regression 2SLS Estimates 
OLS 
Estimates 
i) Tax rates changes and instruments 
-0.973 -0.887 -0.108 
itτΔ  -.- -.- (-3.009)*** (-3.712)*** (-0.968) 
0.165 0.114 MAX
itτ  (6.649)*** (4.347)*** -.- -.- -.- 
0.148 Leftit
MAX
it ⋅− − )( 3ττ  -.- (3.400)*** -.- -.- -.- 
ii ) Controls      
-0.010 -0.008 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 Employmentt-3 
(×105) (-5.024)*** (-4.016)*** (-3.889)*** (-3.602)*** (-2.609)*** 
-0.020 -0.033 0.635 0.634 0.621 Industry mix shock (-0.256) (-0.456) (3.492)*** (3.302)*** (3.194)*** 
Local labor market 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
iii) Identification and instrument validity statistics 
Partial R2 0.081 0.128 -.- -.- -.- 
F-test of excluded 
instruments 
44.21 
  [0.000] 
23.63 
  [0.000] -.- -.- -.- 
Hansen J Statistic -.- -.- -.- 0.186 [0.666] -.- 
Included instruments -.- -.- MAXitτ  
MAX
itτ  &  
Left
it
MAX
it
⋅
− − )( 3ττ
 
-.- 
No. Observations 675 675 675 675 675 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 
10% level. 2. Figures within brackets are p-values. 
 
 
First-stage regression results show that both the maximum tax rate, Maxitτ  and the interaction 
term leftit
Max
it ⋅− − )( 3ττ  are statistically significant determinants of tax rate changes. The F-test 
of excluded instruments takes a value which is above 20 in both cases22. Hence, the instruments 
proposed seem to shift tax rate changes. Note that the partial R2 increases from 8 to 12% when 
including leftit
Max
it ⋅− − )( 3ττ  as an excluded instrument. 
 
We now turn to the second-stage results. The last column of the table shows the OLS results for 
comparative purposes. The 2SLS estimates of the effect of taxes on employment growth are 
                                                 
22 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest, as a rule of thumb, that an F-test below 10 may be associated with 
weak instrument problems. 
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 negative and statistically different from zero. The effect is -0.973 when only Maxitτ  is used and -
0.887 when both Maxitτ  and leftitMaxit ⋅− − )( 3ττ  are used. This implies that a municipality that 
increases its business tax rate one standard deviation below the average increases municipal 
employment growth by approximately 5% over a three-year period. Note that the estimate 
obtained by OLS is -0.108 indicating the need for instrumental variables estimation. The 
assumption that the maximum tax rate is uncorrelated to employment shocks is not testable 
when only Maxitτ  is used as an instrument. However, when both Maxitτ  and leftitMaxit ⋅− − )( 3ττ  are 
used, a test of over-identifying restrictions can be computed. The Hansen J statistic takes a low 
value and, as such, does not raise concerns about the validity of the instruments. 
 
Thus, we obtained OLS estimates for the interaction terms between local taxes and AE which 
are unbiased under plausible assumptions in section 3.3 and, above, we also obtained an 
instrumental variables estimate of an average effect of local taxes on employment growth. We 
now aim at obtaining joint estimates of all these parameters. A conservative approach would be 
to instrument all variables containing tax rate changes, i.e., itτΔ , 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  and 
33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ . Instruments for the interaction terms are simply obtained by interacting 3−itγ  
and 33 −− ⋅ itit μγ  with instruments Maxitτ  and leftitMaxit ⋅− − )( 3ττ 23. The results of this exercise are 
reported in the first column of Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic provided by the Stata command ivreg2 rejects the hypothesis that 
the model is unidentified. Note that the F-test of excluded instruments can be misleading in the case 
where several variables are endogenous. 
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 Table 4. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). Changes 
defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 1999-2002. 
Instrumental variables estimates. 
 [1] [2] [3] 
i) Intertwined effects of local taxes and AE 
-0.886 -0.886 -0.863 
itτΔ  (-1.834)* (-1.842)* (-3.534)*** 
-0.336 -0.336 -0.375 
3−⋅Δ itit γτ  (-0.704) (0.717) (-2.245)** 
0.151 0.151 0.224 
33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  (1.636) (1.750)* (3.582)*** 
ii ) Controls    
-0.017 -0.017 -0.016 Employmentt-3 (×105) (-3.275)*** (-3.023)*** (-3.353)*** 
0.522 0.522 0.509 Industry mix shock (2.140)** (2.106)** (2.961)*** 
Local labor market dummies Yes Yes Yes 
iii) Instrumented variables 
itτΔ  Yes -.- Yes 
3−⋅Δ itit γτ  & 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  Yes -.- No 
iv) Hausman Endogeneity test  
0.708 ≡1v itτΔ  -.- (1.438) -.- 
≡2v  3−⋅Δ itit γτ  -.- -0.186 (-0.384) -.- 
≡3v 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  -.- 0.122 (0.977) -.- 
3.41 Wald-test 0321 === vvv  -.- [0.017] -.- 
0.48 Wald-test 032 == vv  -.- [0.618] -.- 
No. Observations 675 675 675 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 
10% level. 2. Figures within brackets are p-values. 3. Excluded instruments are MAXitτ and 
Leftit
MAX
it ⋅− − )( 3ττ  and their interactions with 3−itγ  & 33 −− ⋅ itit μγ  in all regressions. 4.-Upper-bar 
variables denote first stage fitted values. 
 
 
Note that the estimate we obtain for 1β  (-0.886), which measures the effect of a tax change for 
a municipality with average AE and dissimilarity measures, is very similar to the estimate 
obtained when the AE and dissimilarity measures were left out of the analysis (See Table 3). 
Note, too, that the estimates of the interactions terms 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  and 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  are 
similar to those obtained by OLS estimation (See specification [3] in Table 2). Note, however, 
that instrumental variables comes at the cost of an important loss in terms of efficiency. In the 
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 second Column of Table 4, we report the regression-based results of the Hausman test24. This 
test is performed in three steps. First, each endogenous variable ( itτΔ , 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  and 
33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ ) is regressed on all exogenous variables by OLS and errors are computed (v1, 
v2 and v3). Second, these errors are included as additional variables in an OLS regression of the 
equation of interest. Note that the coefficients are then identical to the 2SLS estimates (compare 
the first and the second columns in Table 4)25. Third, the test on the endogeneity of a set of 
regressors is computed as a simple Wald test on the joint significance of the appropriate first-
stage errors (the v’s). As expected, the hypothesis that none of the variables containing tax rate 
increases, i.e. itτΔ , 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  or 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ , is endogenous is rejected. However, the 
hypothesis that none of the interaction terms, i.e. 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  and 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ  is 
endogenous, cannot be rejected. This suggests that our difference-in-difference sort of approach 
taken in section 3.3 is not problematic. In the last column of Table 4, we present the estimates 
obtained when only itτΔ  is instrumented. Notice that the point estimates do not experience 
significant changes but that the standard errors do, to a large extent, fall. We use this last 
specification to get a grasp of the quantitative importance of AE on the effects of taxes. 
 
The estimate obtained for a municipality with average AE and dissimilarity measures is -0.863 
in this last specification. The estimates of the interaction terms between tax rate changes and our 
AE and dissimilarity measures are -0.375 for the interaction term 3−⋅Δ itit γτ  and 0.224 for the 
interaction term 33 −− ⋅⋅Δ ititit μγτ . This indicates that the effect of taxes varies significantly 
around the mean. The coefficient of variation of the municipal-specific point estimate of the 
effect of taxes on employment growth, iβˆ , is 39%. To illustrate the extent of this variation, note 
that one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the AE measure, increases (decreases) the 
effect of taxes around 43%, i.e. the effect is -1.23 (-0.49), for a municipality with an average 
dissimilarity measure. 
 
3.5. Robustness analysis 
 
We decided to make some additional estimations so as to discard the possibility that our results 
are driven by other explanations. First, due to the skewness of the municipality size distribution 
our dissimilarity measure, iμ , is positively correlated to municipality size. Bucovetzky (1991) 
                                                 
24 See Wooldridge (2002), pp. 118-122. 
 
25 Note that the standard errors are not the same. The 2SLS are the correct ones. 
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 points out that the tax base of a large municipality is less elastic to tax rate changes. This could, 
in principle, be responsible for our result whereby AE lower the effect of taxes for 
municipalities that are very dissimilar in size to their neighbors. As a robustness check, we 
constructed interaction terms of tax rate changes and employment size (both in levels and in 
shares for the appropriate local labor market). These interactions were not statistically 
significant and their introduction had no effect on our estimates of interest. Thus, our results do 
not simply identify an asymmetric competition story in which big cities are less affected by the 
adverse effects of taxes than the smaller ones, regardless of the level of AE.  
 
Second, in Spain, some traditional manufactures that have experienced decline in the last few 
decades (e.g. textiles) show high AE measured by the Ellison-Glaeser agglomeration index 
(1997). It might be the case that taxes have greater effects on declining industries. This could, in 
part, explain why AE led to greater effects of taxes for most of our sample. Our results are 
nevertheless robust to the inclusion of an interaction term between tax rate changes and the 
variable measuring industry mix shocks, itη . Hence, an association between industries with 
high AE and industries in decline does not seem to drive our results, either. 
 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper has been to shed additional light on the effect of AE on the 
sensitivity of economic activities to taxes using Spanish data at the municipal level. This 
empirical set-up has determined the sort of agglomeration economies that we considered here, 
Marshallian AE, as opposed to other mechanisms operating at larger geographic scales (e.g. 
market-access and cost-of-living effects). We first analyzed, at the theoretical level, the impact 
of Marshallian AE on the role of taxes in shaping the allocation of economic activities. We 
found that stronger AE led to increased tax effects, if the jurisdictions were relatively similar in 
size. When this was not the case, stronger AE led to a reduction in the effect of taxes.  
 
We then conducted an empirical analysis using a panel of municipalities from the Spanish 
region of Catalonia for the period 1995-2002. The policy instrument we focused on was a 
municipal tax on business. There exists a maximum tax rate that varies across municipalities 
with population discretely. This institutional feature can be used to produce instrumental 
variable estimates of the effects of tax rate changes on municipal employment growth. To assess 
the empirical validity of the predictions derived in the theoretical analysis we constructed: 1) A 
variable capturing the extent to which industries with high AE are over-represented in a 
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 municipality; 2) A variable capturing the extent to which a municipality is dissimilar to its 
neighbors in terms of size. Our empirical strategy relied on estimating interaction terms between 
these measures and tax rates changes. 
 
We found that an increase in the variable capturing the strength of AE in municipality i implies 
an increase in the effects of taxes if this jurisdiction is relatively similar in size to its neighbors. 
The opposite was true for municipalities which were sufficiently dissimilar in size to their 
neighbors. Hence, our empirical findings provide evidence supporting the results obtained in the 
theoretical analysis. For most municipalities, stronger AE imply a more marked effect of taxes. 
Only in 14% of the municipalities contained in our sample - those that are most dissimilar to 
their neighbors in terms of size - did stronger AE imply a less marked effect of taxes. This may 
be explained by the fact that the municipality size distribution is highly skewed to the right. 
Hence, most municipalities may compete with many neighbors of a similar size. By contrast, the 
largest municipality in a local labor market, which generally acts as the central business district, 
is generally very different in size to its neighbors. For such a municipality, AE may lower the 
effects of taxes since firms may be less willing to move out in exchange for a lower tax bill. 
Note that our results imply that the effect of AE on the sensitivity of economic activities to taxes 
may be very context specific. Our results also suggest that the effect of taxes varies significantly 
across municipalities, reflecting different values of the AE and dissimilarity measures. The 
coefficient of variation of the municipal-specific point estimate of the effect of taxes on 
employment growth, iβˆ , was 39%. Thus, while all the municipalities should be afraid, to some 
degree, of losing tax bases because of mobility, those hosting highly agglomerated industries 
and having a relatively small share of local labor market employment should be even more 
fearful.  
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 Annex 
 
A.1. For expression [7] to be positive, its denominator should be positive assuming that 1<Aτ . 
This can only be the case if ))(2/()1( 2AA EE −⋅−> αγ . Since 4)/(1 2 ≥− AA EE , it follows 
that )1(2 αγ −⋅> . But note that this cannot be the case in a stable and diversified equilibrium 
since for this equilibrium regime to arise )1(2 αγ −⋅<  has to hold. Hence, expression [7] is 
always negative in the diversified equilibrium regime. 
 
A.2. An increase in the strength of AE increases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax 
differentials as long as this inequality holds: 
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In any symmetric stable equilibrium this is the case given that 021 =⋅− AE . For the case that 
21 /EA >  some manipulations are required. Given that )/()1(2 2AA EE −−+ αγ  is a negative 
term in any stable equilibrium, expression [A.1] can be written as: 
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and after re-arranging terms this can be re-written as: 
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Note that ⎟⎟⎠
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 does not depend on any parameter. Besides, it turns 
out that it goes from 4 to - ∞ as AE  goes from 21 /  to 1. Hence, for any parameter 
configuration such that γα >−⋅ )1(2 , there is always some AE  which is close enough to 21 /  
such that this inequality holds. Hence, if the distribution of entrepreneurs is sufficiently even, an 
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 increase in the strength of AE increases the sensitivity to tax differentials on the part of 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Likewise, an increase in the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax 
differentials as long as this inequality holds: 
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which can be written as: 
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When the allocation of entrepreneurs in jurisdiction A exceeds a threshold, 12/12/1 +>AE , 
then 1
)(2
)21(
2
2
>−⋅
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E
. Hence, the right hand side of equation [A.8] becomes negative and, as a 
result, inequality [A.5] holds. Hence, if entrepreneurs are sufficiently concentrated in 
jurisdiction A, an increase in the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax 
differentials.  
 
We have shown that an increase in the strength of AE increases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs 
to tax differentials for any AE  which is close enough to 2/1 . We have found otherwise for any 
AE  which is close enough to 1. Since ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⋅
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)21(11 2
2
2
AA
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AA EE
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EE
 is strictly decreasing for 
all 2/1>AE , then there must be some threshold value AEˆ  such that for any AA EE ˆ2/1 <≤  
inequality [A.1] holds and for any 1ˆ << AA EE  inequality [A.4] holds. 
 
A.3.- In the concentrated case, the fact that 12/12/1 +>AE  also guarantees that an increase 
in the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials by virtue of 
expression [A.5]. For values such that 12/12/1 +<AE  it turns out that 1)(2
)21(
2 <−⋅
⋅−
AA
A
EE
E
 
and hence it is not clear whether equation [A.5] holds. Given a configuration of parameters, the 
smallest AE  for which a concentrated equilibrium can be stable, 
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 { } 21   0)/()1(2/ 2 /EandEEEE AAAAA >=−−+=+ αγ , has to satisfy αγ−⋅=− ++ 121 2AA EE . 
Expression [A.5] can be re-expressed as: 
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When this inequality is evaluated at +AE  it yields: 
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which is always positive. As commented above, ⎟⎟⎠
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 is decreasing in 
AE  for all 0>AE . Hence, given any configuration of parameters, for any +> AA EE , it follows 
that equation [A.6] has to hold. Thus, in any concentrated stable equilibrium, an increase in the 
strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials. 
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